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Abstract
Hydropower dams have been criticised for
their social and environmental implications.
There have been attempts to create
international social standards for hydropower
dam projects, but these standards have had
limited impact. This article uses an extended
environmental justice framework to make
sense of the resettlement and compensation
schemes for Indigenous peoples who were
resettled for the construction of the Bakun
dam in Borneo, East Malaysia. The article
therefore analyses the social protection
measures designed for the protection of
Indigenous peoples and their livelihoods. The
case study is based on in-depth interviews
and focus group discussions with local
communities, institutional actors in Malaysia,
Chinese actors and dam builders. The article
concludes that the social protection policies
did not protect Indigenous people and
their land sufﬁciently, but it facilitated a
commodiﬁcation process of both land and
people. This should also be understood as a
colonisation of their land and their cultures.
Key words: environmental justice, indigenous
groups, social protection, hydropower dams,
Malaysia
1. Introduction
Large hydropower dams present immense
social and environmental challenges for local
communities, which can include resettlement
of affected individuals and communities,
psychological stress, loss or decline of
livelihood and assets, changes to lifestyles
and traditions, impacts on ﬁshing, agriculture
and food security, impacts on access to and
quality of water and a wide range of
environmental adverse effects (Urban et al.
2013). After decades of hydropower dam
building, there is still no comprehensive
remedy for the severe impacts on affected local
people. Hydropower dams have a similar
impact on Indigenous peoples than traditional
extractive industries which often lead to
economic and social marginalisation of
residents in remote and rural areas. Often, local
people obtain few of the beneﬁts that come
with extractive activities on their land. It is
more likely that these activities will threaten
existing and viable livelihoods (Cademartori
2002; Freudenburg 1992). Indigenous peoples
are particularly vulnerable as they have relied
heavily on land which dam building threatens
to undermine and they also tend to suffer under
unequal development that provides external
interests with most of the proﬁt going to non-
Indigenous organisations (Langton & Mazel
2008; Sawyer & Gomez 2012).
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The controversial nature of hydropower
projects forced the World Bank to introduce
social safeguard policies in the 1980s to protect
local people from the consequences of dam
construction and resettlement. Projects such
as the Sardar Sarovar Dam in India, the
Chonoy dam in Guatemala and the Itaparica
hydropower scheme in Brazil became pivotal
to the changes of the World Bank’s approach
to hydropower (Hall 2007). The World
Commission on Dams (WCD) developed the
framework Dams and Development: a New
Framework for Decision-Making in 2000.
The International Hydropower Association
(IHA) launched their own sustainability
guidelines in 2004, followed by their
Sustainability Assessment Protocol in 2010.
There has also been a rise in assessment
techniques such as social impact assessment,
multi-stakeholder platforms and transboundary
environmental impact assessments (EIAs)
(Mirumachi & Torriti 2012).
World Bank withdrew its funding for large
hydropower dams in the 1990s almost
completely but has in recent years re-invested
in hydropower projects. Chinese actors such
as China Export Import Bank (ExIm Bank),
Sinohydro, China Three Georges Corporation
and many other dam builders have taken
over the role of funding hydropower dams.
Chinese actors are often accused for failing
to adhere to international benchmarks.
Sinohydro has been benchmarked by
International Rivers as one of the most well-
performing Chinese hydropower dam builders
with regards to reducing the social and
environmental impacts of large dams but they
are progressing very slowly to adapt to
international standards. An attempt to adapt
and implement international norms for
hydropower dam projects in 2011 (Sinohydro
2011; International Rivers 2012), following
the example of the World Bank and the IFC
Performance Standards, was shelved in 2012,
Sinohydro was re-organised as Sinohydro
Resources and Sinohydro International,
while PowerChina was created as a parent
company owned by the government’s
State Administration for State-Owned
Enterprises.
Hensengerth (2013) suggests that the actual
implementation of environmental and social
guidelines for overseas dams depends on the
local and national circumstances and
governance. Recent studies analysed the social
dimension of Chinese hydropower dams
including analysis of social corporate
responsibility and social sustainability of dam
projects (Nordensvard et al. 2015; Urban
et al. 2015; Hensengerth 2013). All these
studies show important ﬂaws in particular
projects and the lack of overall environmental
and social standards. At the same time,
governments, ﬁnanciers and dam-building
ﬁrms often assume that one can mitigate both
environmental and social impacts in large
hydropower dams.
In this process, there is a need to analyse the
actual social protection measures that
hydropower dam projects offer and consider
them within a larger capitalist global process
of commodiﬁcation of both land and people.
Along these lines, this article primarily aims
to analyse the compensation and resettlement
schemes that were implemented by the state
for Indigenous groups affected by the Bakun
dam in Borneo, Malysia. The Bakun dam is
the ﬁrst dam in Borneo and the largest dam in
Southeast Asia. It is the third largest concrete
face rock ﬁlled dam in the world. It is located
in the tropical rainforest in BelagaDistrict, East
Malaysia, Sarawak, on the river Balui. The
dam development includes a reservoir
occupying 14 170 km2, the size of Singapore
and occupying 12 per cent of Sarawak.
China as a funder and builder of the dam had
little to do with the planning of the site or the
actual relocation scheme which was funded
by the government. To understand the process
of commodiﬁcation of both land and people,
it is important to develop a more complex
understanding of environmental justice that
does not just highlight redistributive and
procedural justice but also include the
relationship between humans and the
environment. The article therefore analyses
the social protection measures designed for
the protection of Indigenous peoples and their
livelihoods. The case study is based on in-
depth interviews and focus group discussions
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with local communities, institutional actors in
Malaysia, Chinese actors and dam builders.
The article concludes that the social protection
policies did not protect Indigenous people and
their land sufﬁciently, but it facilitated a
commodiﬁcation process of both land and
people.
This could also be understood as a
colonisation of their land and their cultures
through a commodiﬁcation of land, taking
control of Indigenous customary land and
developing it for palm oil plantations, logging,
mining or other extractive industries. One of
the problematic areas of such modernisation
policy is to remove the bonds between
Indigenous people and their ancestral land.
Social protection is playing a role in easing this
process rather than creating and sustaining a
more environmentally just development for
humans and the environment.
Section 2 introduces the theoretical
framework and methodology of the study,
section 3 presents the results and discussion
and section 4 concludes the article.
2. Theoretical Framework and
Methodology
This article will use environmental justice as an
analytical tool. The environmental justice
framework originated from an American
context which focused on issues of race
and ethnicity and how these are intertwined
with the distributions of environmental ‘bads’
such as pollution and technological risk
(Bullard 1999). The concept of environmental
justice has become an increasingly important
approach to understand the struggles of
Indigenous people over their land. Native
Americans have been an important ‘part of
the US environmental justice movement, and
Indigenous peoples have used EJ language
and organizing themes in other countries and
regions as well’ (Schlosberg & Carruthers
2010:12).
Pulido (1996), Faber (2005) and Schlosberg
(2007) have highlighted the importance of
process and production in environmental
justice. Distributive justice became a focal
point in framing how communities of colour
have been exposed to environmental hazards,
such as toxic waste or other environmental
issues. Procedural justice focuses therefore
on how the decision-making process in
environmental policy and particular projects
are transparent, just and participative. The
importance lies in creating fair processes for
environmental policy making and policy
implementation. There is a perception that if
the policy making and implementation were
fair, participating parties would tend to
accept a disliked outcome (Deutsch 2000).
Boström created a model based around social
sustainability/environmental justice (2012) that
has been adapted by Urban et al. (2015) and
Nordensvard et al. (2015) to analyse the social
implications of hydropower dam projects in
Ghana and Cambodia and the social policy
measures of Sinohydro.
Substantive justice issues on the other
hand encompass basic needs such as sufﬁcient
food, adequate housing, income and extended
needs, employment/opportunities, basic
services and social services, fair distribution
of environmental ‘bads’ and ‘goods’/equality
of rights. Procedural issues encompass
accountable governance and management of
the policy, planning, and standard-setting
process and its implementation including
holding actors accountable for fulﬁlling their
promises and pledges; social monitoring of
the policy, planning, standard-setting process
and its implementation; access to participation
and decision-making in different stages of the
process and over time, proactive stakeholder
communication and consultation throughout
the process (Boström 2012; Urban et al.
2015; Nordensvard et al. 2015). We argue that
both substantive justice and procedural justice
are important dimensions to understand the
situation of Indigenous people vis-a-vis the
Bakun Dam in Borneo. Still, we argue that
we need to expand our understanding of
environmental justice to understand some
underlying and severe consequences of the
Bakun Dam.
Schlosberg argues that we need to add a
capability dimension to the environment in
environmental justice; this would ‘enrich
conceptions of environmental and climate
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justice by bringing recognition to the
functioning of these systems, in addition to
those who live within and depend on
them’ (Schlosberg 2013:44). Schlosberg and
Carruthers suggest that Indigenous demands
for environmental justice are not just about
distributional equity but also about the
functioning of Indigenous communities, which
highlights traditions and practices, and to
protect the essential relationship between
Indigenous people and their ancestral lands
(2010). This article highlights that we need to
focus the analysis also towards the functioning
and capabilities of Indigenous communities
and their environment (Schlosberg &
Carruthers 2010).
We argue that we need to expand these
notions when we research Indigenous groups
as this more limited notion of environmental
justice omits how hydropower projects
break the bonds between Indigenous groups
and the environment and how this leads
to a commodiﬁcation of both people and
land. Indigenous peoples’ opposition to
particular resource developments has often
been seen to ﬁt within an environmental
justice discourse as it builds on social
movements aiming for a just distributing of
environmental goods, bads and procedural
dimensions such as decision-making and
participation.
We will add a dimension to our
environmental justice analysis in analysing
whether, how and to what extent social
protection/compensation measures are able to
protect the self-reliance of Indigenous groups
and their environment as well as the
relationship to their ancestral lands. The ﬁrst
factor goes beyond just redistributing
resources but discusses how Indigenous groups
can sustain traditional livelihoods and
relationships. The second discusses how social
protection/compensation goes about breaking
the bond between the Indigenous groups and
their land. We have summed up our analytical
understanding of environmental justice in
Table 1.
2.1. Methodology
We draw on a case study from the Bakun
dam. The Bakun dam in Malaysia was
constructed for two main reasons: to provide
electricity for industrial development in
Borneo and, in the long-term, to potentially
provide Peninsula Malaysia with electricity.
The reservoir is the biggest in Malaysia.
The area is a biodiversity hotspot and the
Table 1 Interviews and FGDs Conducted in 2014 and 2015 for the Bakun Dam Research
Community members Malaysian institutional actors Chinese institutional actors
Number of
interviews
20 8 23
Number of
focus group
discussions
7, totalling 66 people — —
Target group 15 longhouse communities that
were resettled to the resettlement
area in Sungei Asap from their
customary lands upstream of the
Balui River in Belaga District,
Sarawak, Borneo, East Malaysia.
Ethnic groups: Kayan, Kenyah,
Lahanan, Ukit and Penan
indigenous people (commonly
referred to as Orang Ulu people).
Dam operators, contractors and
utility ﬁrms like Sarawak Hidro,
Sime Darby, Prime Minister’s
ofﬁce, non-government
organisations such as the Borneo
Resource Institute BRIMAS
Dam builders like Sinohydro, China
Three Georges Corporation,
ﬁnanciers likeExIm Bank, Chinese
ministries (MOFCOM, MFA,
MEP) and regulators
Total number:
51 interviews
and 7 FGDs
with 66 people
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habitat of many endemic and endangered
species, including the orang utan. A total of
15 longhouses composed of more than
9000 Indigenous peoples from the upper
Balui, including some semi-nomads, had to
be resettled into sedentary settlements at
Sungei Asap for the dam construction.
Approximately 50 per cent of the
impoundment area of the Bakun dam is
lands claimed under customary rights
(Sovacool & Valentine 2011). The cost of
resettlement was funded by the Federal
Government. The actual implementation of
resettlement was undertaken by the State
government (interview Sarawak Hidro 29
June 2015). Figure 1 shows a map of the
dam and the resettlement area. Currently the
resettled population at the resettlement site
in Sungei Asap are approximately 51 per
cent Kenyah, 39 per cent Kayan, 5 per cent
Lahanan, 3 per cent Ukit and 2 per cent
Penan Talun. All of these communities are
grouped under the Orang Ulu ethnic category
of Sarawak.
The methodology includes detailed
ﬁeldwork at the dam site and in China. For
the Bakun dam, we conducted 20 semi-
structured in-depth interviews with local
communities directly affected by the dam
through resettlements, seven focus group
discussion with the same affected communities
(of which 57 per cent with women and 43 per
cent with men, each FGD was composed in
average of 9 people). We also conducted eight
interviews with institutional actors from dam
operators, national and local governments and
NGOs in Malaysia, as well as 23 interviews
with Chinese actors such as dam builders,
regulators and ﬁnanciers. This makes a total
of 51 interviews and seven FGDs with 66
people that we draw on for this article.
Fieldwork was conducted in 2013, 2014 and
2015.Table 1 provides an overview of the
interviews and FGDs.
Figure 1 Map of the Bakun Resettlement Area at Sungai Asap, Sarawak, East Malaysia
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We analysed the qualitative data by
categorising and coding the sources as a means
of comparing and contrasting interpretations of
events (Wolcott 1990). We used the Nvivo 10
software to analyse the interview and focus
group consultation data. These were analysed
using narrative analysis (Wiles et al. 2005)
rather than conventional ‘code and retrieve’
because the former allows for more layers of
embodied meaning to be revealed by including
narrative style. This allows us to compare
several cases to be able to draw parallels from
similar ﬁndings and ﬂag up any differences
(Yin 2009). Table 2 shows the coding tree
structure used for analysing the individual
interviews and FGDs in which references are
the number of selections within each source
that have been coded to any theme and
sub-theme. Sources refer to speciﬁc interviews
of FGDs and references refer to how many
times these issues have been mentioned in the
interviews of FGDs.
3. Results and Discussion
3.1. Redistributive and Procedural
Dimensions of Environmental Justice
When we look at the Bakun dam, we might
come to the conclusion that the problem lies
in the actual implementation of resettlement
and compensation schemes. If these social
schemes were improved, then future large
hydropower dam projects could be
implemented with less opposition and less
negative social implications. We ﬁnd a
particular de-coupling from the Chinese funder
and builder when it comes to the social
protection measures at the Bakun dam. The
plan and cost of resettlement were funded by
the Federal Malaysian Government. The
actual implementation of resettlement was
undertaken by the State government of
Sarawak (interview Sarawak Hidro 29 June
2015). The compensation was limited to the
following: house compensation, farm
compensation, compensation from logging
and oil palm companies for the use of the land
previously used by villagers and not inundated
by Bakun dam, and communal compensation
for plantation land used for growing rice
cultivation.
Farm compensation was given according to
the number of fruit trees. The rate changes
from an initially promised RM50-52 [about
US$ 12] per tree to a ﬁnal compensation of
RM5-9 [US$ 1.2-2.1] or RM30 [US$ 7]
according to different villagers interviewed
(these prices mainly refer to cocoa plant and
pepper plant). Plantation compensation
Table 2 Adapted Social Sustainability Framework for Hydropower Dams, Derived and Amended from Boström
2012 and Schlosberg & Carruthers 2010
Substantive social sustainability
Basic needs such as sufﬁcient food, adequate housing, income and extended needs
Employment and opportunities for learning and self-development
Provision of basic services such as clean water supply, sanitation, reliable electricity supply, schooling/education, health
services, mobility/transportation
Fair distribution of environmental ‘bads’ and ‘goods’/Equality of rights, including human rights, land user and tenure rights,
and indigenous people’s rights
Procedural social sustainability
Accountable governance and management of the policy, planning, and standard-setting process and its implementation,
including holding actors accountable for fulﬁlling their promises and pledges.
Social monitoring of the policy, planning, standard-setting process and its implementation.
Access to participation and decision making in different stages of the process and over time/Proactive stakeholder
communication and consultation throughout the process
Functioning and capabilities of Indigenous communities and their environment
How and to what extent social protection measures are able to protect the self-reliance of Indigenous groups and their
environment.
How and to what extent social protection measures are able to protect Indigenous groups relationship to their ancestral lands.
How Indigenous groups can sustain traditional livelihoods and relationships.
How social protection/compensation goes about breaking the bond between the Indigenous groups and their land.
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(temuda) was priced at RM50 000–RM80 000
[US$ 12 000–90 000]. The compensation
given to villagers from oil palm or logging
companies for using the customary lands at
Bakun dam was RM500 [US$ 120] per head.
All compensations referred to the inundated
area and the land located within the perimeter
of the reservoir were paid by the government
in two phases. In the ﬁrst phase, villagers got
30 per cent of the total value of compensation.
In the second phase, villagers got the
remaining 70 per cent.
There was also individual compensation for
people born before 1998 (RM13 000 per
person) and compensation for burial grounds
(moving grave RM4000 and not moving grave
RM1500 or RM2000). This was one-off
payments which has been criticised for not
creating a more sustainable compensation for
Indigenous people that have been removed
from their lands, lost access to large parts of
the land and compensated in rather meagre
terms.
The actual implementation of compensation
has been perceived by locals to be too little,
inadequate and/or partly ﬂawed. One of the
core criticisms was the compensation for land.
In the case of the Bakun dam, after
resettlement, each family was provided with 3
acres of land in the resettlement sites as
compensation for the lost land in the reservoir
area of the dam where people had free
access to customary land. The customary land
pre-resettlement was cultivated mainly with
rice and vegetables for subsistence purposes,
and it was enough to support family needs.
Post-dam construction, the land was limited
to 3 acres per family. A discussion point is if
exchanging access to a much larger area
with a small plot of land is a reasonable
compensation. There have been voices among
the Indigenous community that argue that the
land is not enough for their needs (Interview
from FGD with men in Uma Badeng).
There have also been voices within
Indigenous communities that some plots of
lands have been of substandard quality,
hence low fertility land, which makes it
difﬁcult to sustain the local population. Issues
of land fertility in the resettlement sites have
been mentioned by the villagers we
interviewed.
‘[A]lmost everything is not suitable to be planted
here, vegetables as well. The only thing that is
suitable is oil palm trees, but there is not enough
space to plant them in the 3 acres of land’ (quote
from man respondent in Uma Juman).
Difﬁcult access to the 3 acres of land
received by the government as compensation
is also an issue for the resettled communities.
Land allocated to resettled communities is
often located far away from the resettlement
site, and there is no proper road to access
the land. Some villagers reported that they
have to walk for two hours to reach their
lands (Interview from man respondent in
Uma Juman). In the case of the Bakun
dam, in terms of access to water resources,
villagers reported that the water they can
access in the resettlement site is polluted,
smelly (smell of rust) and with a yellowish
colour. Moreover, sometimes, the water
supply is not regular, and there is no water
provision for several days due to problems
with excessive sedimentation and insufﬁcient
water pressure to pump the water from the
river. Some villagers have also stated that
water pollution comes from the chemicals
used in the oil palm plantations owned by
private companies located on the banks of
the river.
‘Because at the upstream, i.e. Koyan River (a
water catchment), there are many oil palm
plantations, they use a lot of pesticides, and they
go into the water, it is a big problem. Moreover,
the water ﬁlter doesn’t work properly’ (quotes
from FGD with men in Uma Badeng resettled
longhouse).
With regards to compensation, villagers
have complained to have waited a lot of
time (some years) before they were given
the overall compensation amount. No
compensation was given for the land outside
the perimeter (land under customary rights)
that was inundated after the construction of
the dam. This was not taken into account by
the government in the ﬁrst land survey because
the water inundated more land than the one
7Cooke et al.: Hydropower dams and Indigenous people
© 2017 The Authors. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies
published by JohnWiley & Sons Australia, Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
initially measured. Villagers are asking for
compensation for this land.
‘The problem is the compensation for land. There
are a lot of farms that have been measured and
are submerged but have yet to receive
compensation. There are some submerged lands
that are not within the perimeter but they did not
compensate for it’ (quote from FGD with men in
Uma Ukit).
One could say that the governments could
improve their records by improving both
the quality and size of land given as
compensation to the Indigenous people.
Instead, Indigenous people had problems
accessing some of the funding such as the full
house compensation. Only after more than ten
years of complaints and struggles with the
Government villagers obtained to get the
new house for free. Initially, the Government
was giving a new house at a value of RM
52 000 [US$ 12 400] maximum, if the value
of the old house at Bakun was lower, then
villagers had to pay the price difference by
loan. However after more than ten years of
negotiations, the villagers managed to get
back the differential they paid to the
Government. From a strict social policy
perspective, one could also highlight the
positive side effects of the relocation as it
has given easier access to welfare services
such as health care compared to the old
settlement. People have easier access to roads,
clinics and schools. They do not have to take
the boat and travel for an entire day to reach
the hospital. Now, they can go by cars to the
nearest city, i.e. Bintulu (about 3 hours’ drive
away from the resettlement area (Interview
from FGD with female in Uma Badeng).
‘Schools and clinics were the only thing that was
difﬁcult for us back then [pre-dam construction]
because it would take us one day to go to the
clinic. We used longboats with engines to shorten
the time’ (quote from FGD with men in Uma
Ukit).
Remote communities are now no longer
remote in the sense of social services, which
means not just easier access to health care but
also a better access to schools for their children.
‘Back then my high school was at a town in the
Belaga district. We went to school using a
longboat. In a day, we went through a lot of
dangerous rapids. We had to land, go down using
the longboat rope, go pass all the rapids and get
back into the longboat. It took us one day to reach
back the village.’ (quote from Village men in
UMA Badeng).
Moreover some highlights that being closer to
schools has helped people with less income
to send their children to school. Before the
resettlement ‘only those who could afford it
could send their children to school’ (quote
from Village man in Uma Belor).
This highlights that the ﬂaws in actual
compensation and resettlement are however at
least superﬁcial redeemed by better access
to social services. This is an interesting and
problematic statement as we will discuss
further on. When we look at procedural justice,
we will ﬁnd that the dam building, resettlement
and compensation process has been ﬂawed.
One of the most important environmental
requirements was the preparation of the EIA
which needed to be approved by the Director
General of Environmental Quality. The project
was not allowed to proceed unless approval of
the EIA report had been granted (Department
of Environment, 2010). University Malaysia
Sarawak (UNIMAS) acted as the main
consultant for the EIA of the Bakun project.
Interaction and communication with resettled
people during the preparation of the EIA
including negotiations of compensation terms,
land allocations and resettlement were carried
out mainly between village leaders, village
committees and state departments.
The negotiations of compensation terms,
land allocations and resettlement have been
carried out mainly between village leaders,
village committees and state departments such
as: the Chief Ministry, The District ofﬁce,
Department of Information, the Resident’s
ofﬁce, and the Land and Survey Department.
Suggestions for compensation were discussed
within the communities and brought by
the village leaders to the attention of the
government during a meeting in Kuching.
However, these suggestions were never
taken into consideration by the government.
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Prior to resettlement, government development
agencies provided information selectively, but
generally only regarding favourable aspects
of resettlement (interview community leader,
Kenyah 18 April 2015). There were some
initial concerns about leaving the land, but
people were told that their land would be
ﬂooded by the reservoir anyway. They were
told that there would be jobs, enough land to
replace the ones land, infrastructure especially
roads, electricity, water and, more importantly
health clinics and schools for their children.
The idea was sold to the Indigenous people like
‘the city in the jungle’ (interview, 4 men, Uma
Badeng 16 April 2014).
The big issue when we look from a
procedural aspect is not only the skewed
information campaign but also the lack of
real participation. There has been a general
voice that most people could not participate
themselves but only through their leaders.
After resettlement, many locals felt betrayed
by their leaders who has been as ‘Gods’ but
they felt that the leaders did not look after their
interests and they mismanaged their roles
through missing compensation money, not
knowing how to report protests of their people
and just accepting cheques (interview, Uma
Belor, 7 April 2014).
The results show that neither the
redistributive nor the procedural dimension of
the dam project has been satisfactory, but there
is a deeper and more worrisome dimension of
breaking the bond between Indigenous people
and their ancestral land. This would be in line
with Schlosberg and Carruthers more extended
view on environmental justice that includes the
functioning of Indigenous communities.
In our case study, we looked therefore at
two aspects of functioning: the possibility to
sustain a traditional life style and maintaining
a relationship to ancestral lands. The
conclusion of a more expanded understanding
of environmental justice leads us to see how
the compensation has led to a commodiﬁcation
of both Indigenous people and their lands. In
the end, this means a colonisation of their
living space. We have summoned the extended
ﬁnding in Table 3. The ﬁrst factor goes beyond
just redistributing resources but discusses how
Indigenous groups can sustain traditional
livelihoods and relationships. The second
discusses how social protection goes about
breaking the bond between the Indigenous
groups and their land.
3.2. Maintaining Relationships to Ancestral
Lands
One of the more serious impacts of
hydropower dams have been the
commodiﬁcation of land, taking control of
Indigenous custodian land and developing
these lands for palm oil, mining or other
Table 3 Coding Structure Using Nvivo
Sources References
Resettlement 4 5
Psychological impacts 5 10
Others 4 8
Life changes 13 28
Involvement and consultation
Resettlement 12 25
Conﬂicts 11 38
Complaint 9 31
Compensation 16 117
Interaction and communication 15 115
Impacts
Social network 10 48
Livelihood changes 1 1
Shifting livelihood strategies 11 42
Improvement of livelihood 12 37
Decreasing livelihood 13 46
Lifestyle 11 33
Interactions with immigrants 11 17
Health care 13 19
Energy access 15 34
Education 17 56
Ecological impacts
Water ﬂow
Water access and quality 11 23
Flooding 5 10
Decreased water ﬂow 2 3
Land 7 17
Fish stocks and aquatic life 3 5
Fauna and ﬂora 9 12
Environmental protection 5 5
Access to local resources 17 106
Expectations
Past 9 14
Future 13 30
Cultural impacts 9 31
Compensation 7 19
Challenges 8 13
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extractive industries. One of the problematic
areas of such modernisation policy is to
remove the bonds between Indigenous people
and their ancestral land. In terms of land and
house titles, villagers said that they have only
a temporary occupational license grant which
lasts for 60 years. After that period, they will
lose their ownership, which can be renewed,
but they would have to pay a price for it, almost
RM30 000 for the 3 acres of land. This
highlights a direct land grab replaced by 3
acres of land whereas people used to have full
access to land and forest pre-dam construction
(Table 4). Some resettled villagers in Sarawak,
Malaysia reported that they do not have land
titles in the resettlement sites, so they cannot
sell the land and they are afraid about the fact
that without titles the government could
reclaim their lands in the future:
‘The land title is not a freehold grant. This is a
TOL (Temporary Occupational License) grant.
It expires within a ﬁxed period of time. Sixty
years only. When the expiry date comes, the
land is no longer ours. It can be renewed but
there is a chance we will have to pay. I heard
we have to pay at least RM30,000 for the 3
acres of land. This is what scares the villagers.
The land was promised to us for a lifetime.
Turns out, there’s an expiry date. When that
expiry date comes, how are those people who
have no money going to renew the license?’
(quote from men respondents in Uma Badeng
resettled longhouse).
Other villagers asked for compensation by
logging and oil palm companies that were
using the land not inundated but under
customary rights claiming it was state land
given to them by the government. The
government also promised to give to the
villagers 30 per cent of the logging revenues,
but they have not received them. Resettled
villagers are occupying new land around the
resettlement sites or reoccupying the land not
inundated by the reservoir in the dam area,
claiming their customary rights over the old
land.
The newly occupied land or the reoccupied
land in the dam area are mainly used for oil
palm plantations which are easier to grow in
the less fertile land in the resettlement site,
and it provides better revenues to villagers
than vegetables and rice cultivations. The
occupation of new lands is taking place in the
land owned by the Sarawak government, the
so-called State land. This land and the land
not inundated at the dam site are also targeted
by private oil palm, rubber or logging
companies, which usually have better access
to State land use permits than resettled
villagers. The presence of multiple interests
on the land by the government, the local
Table 4 Resettlement and Compensation Process
Sustaining traditional livelihoods Maintaining relationship to ancestral lands
Area Content Frame Content
Self-sustaining
livelihoods vs.
dependency on
capitalist market
system
The resettlement is based on removing
people from their environment where
their dependence on each other was
vital for survival as they had access to
resources through their environment.
Moving people out of their context has
made them more dependent on capitalist
structures such as currency to support
transport, access to natural resources
that are now longer available at the
resettlement site and the need to sell
and buy products from a market system.
In many ways, it is a forced integration
into a capitalist system which
commodiﬁes relationships.
Ancestral land
vs. Natural
resource
exploitation
The removal of indigenous right to
land can only be understood through a
commodiﬁcation of land; land that were
there to support eco-systems where human
played an integral part in up-keeping the
balance have been ﬂooded to provide
electricity for a possible industrialisation
of Sarawak has two direct implications on
our understanding land. Land belongs to
people in capitalist systems where in many
indigenous belief people belong to land. In
a capitalist system land is replaceable and
valued upon the resources that it provides.
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communities and the plantation or logging
companies create conﬂicts over land use,
particularly between private companies and
communities, as reported in the quote below.
‘With regard to occupation of customary land by
logging companies, if the government is really
responsible, the logging company should not
come in again at the Bakun dam. That’s the
problem. I have heard about an agreement. But
the logging still exists. If we know that the
company comes into our compound (the old land
at the dam site), we ask them to pay. That is the
only way to get income from that. The conﬂict
now is at this point. The solution is the company
will pay us’ (quotes from FGD with men in Uma
Badeng).
3.3. Sustaining Traditional Livelihoods
One of the concerns is how little by little the
Malaysian government deconstructs the base
for sustaining Indigenous communities
through resettlement and compensation. One
aspect that could be both seen as positive
and negative is the reliance on formal
structures such as markets, paid labour, formal
education and formal health care that has
partly made it possible to have a higher living
standard, but it has also undermined the actual
traditional livelihoods of Indigenous peoples.
Moving people out of their context has made
them more dependent on capitalist structures
such as currency to support transport, access
to natural resources that are no longer
available at the new location and the need to
sell and buy products from a market system.
According to the interviews, villagers in the
new settlement area at Sungai Asap rely more
on the market for food provision, which they
were able to get freely from the forest and
dam area before resettlement, and other
goods. Therefore, life is in general more
costly in the resettlement area, and for some
villagers who do not have access to
remunerative jobs, such as the elderly and
women, livelihoods have decreased. The
following quotes indicate this:
‘You must use money for everything here. When I
was at the old place, at least I would get some
income whenever I go hunting, ﬁshing or
searching for rattans’ (quote from FGDwith men
in Uma Ukit).
‘In our old home, it was easier for us to earn a
livelihood. We didn’t use money. Now, that we
have moved here we need to use money. If we go
to the market to buy vegetables, buy meat, how
could we live? Even transportation to the
market cost RM5’ (quote from village man in
Uma Bakah).
‘Our lives were easier at the old place by the river.
If we wanted to catch ﬁsh, it was easy. Here, we
need to use money to even buy ﬁsh at the market’
(quote from female respondent in Uma Belor
resettled longhouse).
The change has meant that Indigenous
groups need access tomoney and therefore will
have to enter the formal or more often the
informal labour market to support themselves,
their families and their communities. This
could be seen as a transformation from a
custodian of a large area of land that supported
them to become part of a labour force. This is
not just a case of land grabbing but also
removing the entitlement to both land and a
traditional life style. On the ﬂipside of the coin,
job opportunities for most of the villagers,
particularly young or middle age men, have
increased after moving in the resettlement site.
This has meant going from more or less
subsistence farming, ﬁshing and hunting to
working for oil palm plantation, logging,
working for Bakun Dam construction or
tourism activity. In terms of farming, in
the new settlement, the government have
introduced schemes for cocoa, pepper, oil palm
and rubber cultivation providing fertilisers and
seeds to farmers. However, according to the
villagers, some of these schemes have not
succeeded due to problems of land scarcity
and low fertility of the land. At same time,
most of the workers building the dam came
from China, and many of the formal works
have gone to workers from other areas of
Malaysia or from Indonesia. This highlights a
radical transformation and a commodiﬁcation
of the people.
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This conjures up the split nature of social
protection as it might raise the living standard
as in access to health care and education, but
it will also undermine the functioning of
Indigenous communities to live off their land
and its natural resources. Behind the social
protection policies is a larger colonisation
strategy of both Indigenous land and people.
Indigenous peoples often argue that humans
are inseparable from other living things and
they see the environment as an interconnected
community (LaDuke 1999; McGregor 2009).
This approach has created an attempt to include
environmental concerns into a movement that
has often been perceived to be anthropocentric
(Shrader-Frechette 2002). ‘When we interrupt,
corrupt, or deﬁle the potential functioning of
ecological support systems, we do an injustice
not only to human beings, but also to all of
those non-humans that depend on the integrity
of the system for their own functioning’
(Schlosberg 2013:44).
Westra links up environmental justice with a
‘biological/ecological integrity model’ which
highlights the importance of interdependence
between the functioning of Indigenous
communities and the functioning of the
environment. ‘If the rights of Indigenous
peoples are based, ﬁrst, on their rights to
biological integrity and natural function; and
second, these rights cannot be separated from
the protection of the ecological integrity of
their lands; then third, entrenching such
rights would limit the freedom of Western
industrial operations to commit crimes’
(Westra 2007:19). Environmental justice needs
therefore to include both the preservation of
Indigenous autonomy and functioning as a
community and the biological integrity of their
ancestral land to prevent ‘biological genocide’
(Westra 2007).
Polanyi highlighted that we do not only need
to de-commodify labour, but our land and
environment are in need for protection against
market forces. Polanyi pointed out the
importance of adding the environment to the
analysis. He argued that there are two further
ﬁctious commodities in addition to labour:
money and land. Land is considered by Polanyi
as ‘another name for nature, which is not
produced by man’ (Polanyi 1944:72). He
argues that the commodiﬁcation of land,
natural resources, the oceans, etc. will generate
collective ‘bads’. This will need a collective
response from society. Polanyi argued for a
more active role of the state in regulating the
land and protecting natural resources from
market forces: ‘[T]he commodity ﬁction
disregarded the fact that leaving the fate of soil
and people to the market would be tantamount
to annihilating them’ (Polanyi 1944: 73). It is
clear in this case that the social protection
measures of the state do not protect either land
or humans from being commodiﬁed but
instead facilitates it.
4. Conclusion
This paper has contributed to discussing the
impact of social protection with regards to
hydropower dam projects on Indigenous
peoples’ customary land in Malaysia. This
article used an extended environmental
justice framework to make sense of the
resettlement and compensation schemes for
Indigenous peoples who were resettled for
the construction of the Bakun dam, Borneo,
East Malaysia.
The results shows that neither the
redistributive nor the procedural dimension of
the dam project has been satisfactory, but there
is a deeper and more worrisome dimension of
breaking the bond between Indigenous people
and their ancestral land. The nation state
could be questioned as an organisation that
represents all people in their country. Fraser
has highlighted that in our global world the
nation state itself becomes a vessel for injustice
for national and global elites. Often ‘states and
transnational elites monopolize the activity of
frame-setting, denying voice to those who
may be harmed in the process, and blocking
creation of democratic arenas where the latter’s
claims can be vetted and redressed’ (Fraser
2005:85). The role of Indigenous people in
relation to their ancestral land on one side and
the local, national and international elites on
global scale collides in the case of hydropower
dams. There is a lack of interest to respect
both the needs and the historical rights of
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Indigenous people in the name of nation state
interests.
This would be in line with Schlosberg
and Carruthers more extended view on
environmental justice that includes the
functioning of Indigenous communities. In
our case study, we looked therefore at two
aspects of functioning: the possibility to
protect and develop a traditional life style
and maintaining a relationship to ancestral
lands. The conclusion of a more expanded
understanding of environmental justice leads
us to see how the compensation has led to a
commodiﬁcation of both Indigenous people
and their lands. In the end, this means a
colonisation of their living space created
through the nation state where the state is a
direct vehicle of injustice towards Indigenous
populations.
We could therefore see this is a double
ﬂawed process: not only was the actual process
to involve and compensate Indigenous people
ﬂawed, but more importantly a lot of the
policies did support land grabs and the
breaking up of traditional Indigenous ways of
life.
There is therefore a need for a global
approach to solve the issues more than an
attempt to respect the nation state rights to
allow exploitation of Indigenous peoples.
Fraser argues that we will need to leave a
nation state framework for an all-affected
principle where ‘all those affected by a given
social structure or institution have moral
standing as subjects of justice in relation to it’
(2005:82). It is therefore of importance to
discuss the global ethics of both low carbon
development and social protection. As it stands
now, low carbon development could also mean
policy activities that result in negative impacts
such as land grabs, undermining of
biodiversity, and undermining the traditional
lives of Indigenous people in Borneo and
elsewhere.
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